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I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2004, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down a decision in the case of Crawford v. Washington.1  With this 
decision, the Court changed the future of evidence law by 
restricting the admissibility of hearsay evidence to comply with an 
earlier, and more conservative, understanding of the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.  In doing so, the Court 
 
       †   Assistant Public Defender.  J.D. William Mitchell, 2002; M.A. University of 
St. Thomas, 1998; B.A. University of Minnesota, 1995.  Thank you to Magic Wendy 
for editing assistance and support. 
 1. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). 
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partially overruled Ohio v. Roberts.2 
This article will examine the Crawford holding and its effects 
on hearsay law in criminal trials in Minnesota.  First, it will attempt 
to explain the Crawford holding and the Supreme Court’s analysis.3  
Next, it will examine Crawford’s general effect on the Minnesota 
Rules of Evidence concerning hearsay.4  Then, this article will 
consider Crawford’s effect upon criminal cases and some of the 
arguments it presents for criminal defense attorneys and 
prosecutors.5  Finally, this article will conclude that the Crawford 
decision is a small boon for criminal defense attorneys.6 
II. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
The issue in Crawford v. Washington centered on the statement 
of a witness to a fight.  The witness gave a tape-recorded statement 
to law enforcement but was subsequently unavailable to testify at 
trial.7 
A. The Facts of Crawford 
In Washington state, the Petitioner, Michael D. Crawford 
(Crawford), and his wife, Sylvia, went to the apartment of Kenneth 
Lee (Lee).8  Crawford believed that Lee had attempted to rape 
Sylvia and a fight ensued.9  During the fight, Lee was fatally stabbed 
and Crawford’s hand was cut.10  After the fight, Crawford and Sylvia 
were individually interviewed by law enforcement and gave tape-
recorded statements.11 
In his interview with law enforcement, Crawford stated that 
during the fight he thought Lee had something in his hands.12  
Contrastingly, in Sylvia’s interview with law enforcement, she stated 
that she witnessed the fight and that she did not see anything in 
Lee’s hands.13  Indeed, she stated that Lee’s arms were open when 
 
 2. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. See infra Part V. 
 7. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1357–58 (2004). 
 8. Id. at 1357. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. at 1357–58. 
 12. Id. at 1357.  This is how Crawford accounted for the cut on his own hand. 
 13. Id. 
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he was stabbed in the torso.14 
The State charged Crawford with assault and attempted 
murder, and he claimed self defense at trial.15  Sylvia did not testify 
at trial due to the state’s marital privilege.16  Although Crawford 
claimed that the admission of Sylvia’s taped statement violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him, the 
court nonetheless allowed the taped statement into evidence under 
the hearsay exception for statements against interest.17 
The law governing the admissibility of Sylvia’s statement came 
from Ohio v. Roberts.18  Under Roberts, the hearsay statement of a 
witness may be used against a criminal defendant if the statement 
bears “adequate indicia of reliability” by either (1) bearing 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” or (2) falling within 
a “firmly rooted hearsay exception.”19  The trial court found that 
Sylvia’s statements bore adequate indicia of reliability.20  The jury 
found Crawford guilty of assault.21 
The Washington Court of Appeals applied a nine-factor test 
and reversed the trial court.  The court held that Sylvia’s statement 
did not bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”22  Then, 
the Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, holding 
that Sylvia’s statement did indeed bear “guarantees of 
trustworthiness” because it “interlock[ed]” with Crawford’s 
statement.23  On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the 
single issue was “whether the State’s use of Sylvia’s statement 
violated the Confrontation Clause.”24 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. (referencing WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994), which generally 
bars a spouse from testifying without the other’s consent).  The same privilege 
exists in Minnesota.  MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 1(a) (2004). 
 17. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358. (citing WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (2003)). 
 18. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 19. Id. at 66. 
 20. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358 (noting that Sylvia did not attempt to shift 
blame, corroborated Crawford’s version of events, was a direct eyewitness, 
described recent events, and was questioned by a “‘neutral’ law enforcement 
officer”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. (highlighting that the statement contradicted an earlier statement, was 
in response to specific questions, and that Sylvia admitted she shut her eyes during 
the stabbing). 
 23. Id. (citing the similarity of Sylvia’s statement to Crawford’s). 
 24. Id. at 1359. 
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B. The Court’s Analysis 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states 
that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . .”25  
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion penned by Justice Scalia, 
began its analysis by noting that the language of the Sixth 
Amendment allows for two possible interpretations: (1) the term 
“witnesses” refers only to witnesses who testify at trial; or (2) the 
term “witnesses” refers more broadly to all “those whose statements 
are offered at trial.”26  Because the language of the Sixth 
Amendment alone does not state which meaning was intended, the 
Court “turn[ed] to the historical background of the Clause to 
understand its meaning.”27 
The Court pointed out that a defendant’s right to confront an 
accuser dates back to Roman times.28  The right to confrontation 
was familiar to the Framers of the United States Constitution 
through the common law, which contained a right to 
confrontation; however, the common law was unclear as to how the 
right should be utilized specifically.29  Although the United States 
Constitution did not originally contain a right of confrontation, 
that right was added at the First Congress in the Sixth 
Amendment.30 
After illustrating the history of the right to confrontation, the 
Court declared two guiding principles in its decision.31  First, the 
Court declared that between the two possible readings of the Sixth 
Amendment, it is the broader reading that was intended by the 
drafters.32  Specifically, the Court declared that the Confrontation 
Clause “applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, 
those who ‘bear testimony.’”33  To arrive at this conclusion, the 
Court explained, 
the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, 
 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 26. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 1360–61. 
 30. Id. at 1363.  See generally NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON 
LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 355 (1997). 
 31. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1363. 
 32. See id. at 1364. 
 33. Id. 
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and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as 
evidence against the accused.  It was these practices that    
. . . English law’s assertion of a right to confrontation was 
meant to prohibit; and that the founding-era rhetoric 
decried.  The Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with 
this focus in mind. 
Accordingly, we once again reject the view that the 
Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-
court testimony. . . . Leaving the regulation of out-of-court 
statements to the law of evidence would render the 
Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most 
flagrant inquisitorial practices.34 
The next logical question is then what it means to “bear 
testimony.”  The Court “leave[s] for another day any effort to spell 
out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial;’”35 however, the 
Court did provide examples.  “[E]x parte testimony at a preliminary 
hearing” is testimonial.36  “Statements taken by police officers in the 
course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow 
standard.”37  In addition, 
[v]arious formulations of this core class of “testimonial” 
statements exist: “ex parte in-court testimony or its 
functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial 
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be 
used prosecutorially,” Brief for Petitioner 23; 
“extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions,” White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 
365. . . (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment); “statements that 
were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial,” Brief for 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as 
Amici Curiae 3.38 
For the second guiding principle in its decision, the Court 
once again looked to the past and held that, “[t]he historical 
 
 34. Id. at 1363–64. 
 35. Id. at 1374. 
 36. Id. at 1364. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (citations as they appear in the opinion). 
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record . . . supports . . . that the Framers would not have allowed 
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not 
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the 
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”39  
Finally, with two guiding principles in mind,40 the Court turned its 
attention to Ohio v. Roberts41 and the law under which the Ohio 
courts based their decisions in that case. 
Under Roberts, hearsay is admissible if it either (1) falls within a 
traditional hearsay exception, or (2) possesses “indicia of 
reliability.”42  In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the Roberts 
test is both too narrow and too broad in relation to the historical 
hearsay principles described above.43  First, the Roberts test is too 
broad because “[i]t applies the same mode of analysis whether or 
not the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony,” and it is too narrow 
because “[i]t admits statements that do consist of ex parte testimony 
upon a mere finding of reliability.”44  The Court held, 
[a]dmitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is 
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.  To 
be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability 
of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. . . 
.  The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested 
by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial 
determination of reliability. . . .  The unpardonable vice of 
the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its 
demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial 
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to 
exclude.45 
Thus, the rule of Crawford is that “[t]estimonial statements of 
witnesses absent from trial [are to be] admitted only where the 
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine.”46 
 
 39. Id. at 1365. 
 40. See id. at 1367 (“Our case law has been largely consistent with these two 
principles.”). 
 41. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 42. Id. at 66. 
 43. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 1370–71. 
 46. Id. at 1369. 
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C. The Court’s Decision 
Setting aside the Roberts “reliability factors,” the Court 
concluded that Sylvia’s interview by law enforcement was 
testimonial and Crawford had no opportunity to cross-examine 
her.47  In finding Sylvia’s statement to be testimonial, the Court 
considered that Sylvia’s statement was made “while in police 
custody,” Sylvia was a potential suspect, and Sylvia was told that her 
potential release from custody depended on the results of the 
investigation.48  In addition, Crawford clearly had no opportunity to 
cross-examine Sylvia nor did he call her as a witness.49  Therefore, 
Crawford’s Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against 
him was violated when Sylvia’s statements were allowed into 
evidence at trial.50 
D. Concurrence 
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurrence in which Justice 
O’Conner joined.51  The concurrence’s principal dissatisfaction 
with the majority opinion is that the Court’s concern with the 
difference between testimonial and nontestimonial statements does 
not find sufficient support in history to overrule Roberts.52  The 
concurrence believed that the Framers of the Constitution 
contemplated future exceptions to the hearsay exclusion rule.53  
Indeed, “[w]ith respect to unsworn testimonial statements, there is 
no indication that once the hearsay rule was developed courts ever 
excluded these statements if they otherwise fell within a firmly 
rooted exception.”54  The purpose of the Confrontation Clause is 
“to ‘advance the accuracy of the truth-determining process in 
criminal trials.’”55  Some of the recognized hearsay exceptions 
advance this purpose.  For example, the statements of a co-
conspirator are made while “the declarant and the accused are 
 
 47. Id. at 1374. 
 48. Id. at 1372. 
 49. Id. at 1374. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1374–78. 
 52. Id. at 1374–75. 
 53. Id. at 1377 (“It is an odd conclusion indeed to think that the Framers 
created a cut-and-dried rule with respect to the admissibility of testimonial 
statements when the law during their own time was not fully settled.”). 
 54. Id. at 1376 (citations omitted). 
 55. Id. at 1377 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986)). 
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partners in an illegal enterprise, [and therefore] the statements are 
unlikely to be false and their admission” enhances the truth-finding 
process of a criminal trial.56 
The concurrence concludes that it would reach the same 
opinion as the majority without overruling Roberts.57  The 
concurrence notes that the Washington Supreme Court relied 
upon the “interlocking nature” of the statements of Crawford and 
Sylvia in order to find that Sylvia’s statement bore guarantees of 
trustworthiness and, thus, was admissible.58  The concurrence stated 
that the Court unnecessarily “change[s] course;” rather, it should 
have followed stare decisis and looked to its earlier opinion, Idaho v. 
Wright, in which it held that “an out-of-court statement was not 
admissible simply because the truthfulness of that statement was 
corroborated by other evidence at trial.”59  Therefore, “[n]o re-
weighing of the ‘reliability factors’ . . . is required to reverse the 
judgment here.  A citation to Idaho v. Wright . . . would suffice.”60 
III. THE INTERSECTION OF CRAWFORD, ROBERTS, AND THE 
MINNESOTA RULES OF EVIDENCE 
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”61  Generally, hearsay is 
inadmissible; however, case law and the rules of evidence provide 
exceptions62 and exemptions.63  The purpose of excluding hearsay 
is to ensure that testifying witnesses perceived and clearly 
remember events about which they testify.64  When addressing the 
admissibility of hearsay, courts must now look to three specific 
places: (1) the Crawford test, (2) the Roberts test, and (3) the Rules 
of Evidence. 
Although the Crawford decision describes the failings of the 
 
 56. Id. at 1377. 
 57. Id. at 1378. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820–24 (1990)). 
 60. Id. 
 61. MINN. R. EVID. 801(c); FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 62. MINN. R. EVID. 803; FED. R. EVID. 803. 
 63. MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (“Statements which are not hearsay.”); FED. R. 
EVID. 801(d)(1). 
 64. JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245 (5th. ed. 2003) (stating 
that “the rule against hearsay is designed to insure compliance with” perception, 
memory, narration, and the sincerity of the witness). 
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Roberts reliability test, Crawford did not completely overrule Roberts.  
The following is a list of some hearsay exceptions under the 
Minnesota Rules of Evidence and an analysis of the effect of 
Crawford on each. 
A. Excited Utterance65 
An “excited utterance” (or spontaneous declaration) is made 
while the declarant is under the “stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition.”66  “The rationale supporting admission [of an 
excited utterance] is that the emotional stress suspends the process 
of reflective thought necessary for conscious fabrication, and that 
the recentness of the event minimizes the danger of faulty 
memory.”67  The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is 
an area in which the Crawford decision may cause confusion.68 
When addressing an excited utterance, it is not enough that 
the court decides if a statement was indeed uttered during the 
“stress of excitement” to determine if it is admissible.69  Rather, 
under Crawford, a court must also ask whether the statement was 
“testimonial.”70  However, not only did the Crawford Court decline 
to define “testimonial,” it also cast doubt upon whether 
“spontaneous declarations” can be labeled categorically as non-
testimonial.71  The Court considered White v. Illinois in which a 
child victim’s statements to an investigating police officer were 
admitted as spontaneous declarations.72  The Court questioned 
whether such testimonial statements would have been admissible 
under the original understanding of the Confrontation Clause.73  
Although the decision describes the child’s statements as 
“testimonial,” “the justice’s characterization turns on the specific 
facts surrounding the making of the proffered statement.”74  
 
 65. MINN. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 66. Id. 
 67. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 61 (1978). 
    68. Neil P. Cohen & Donald F. Paine, Crawford v. Washington: Confrontation 
Revolution, 40 TENN. B.J. 22, 23 (May 2004) (“[T]he excited utterance . . . is 
illustrative of some disturbing uncertainties created by the Crawford court.”). 
      69.    See MINN. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 70. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1353, 1364 (2004). 
 71. Id. at 1368 n.8. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Treatment of Prosecution Hearsay Under 
Crawford v. Washington: Some Good News But . . . ., 28 CHAMPION 16, 16 (Oct. 
2004). 
9
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Therefore, even excited utterances must be viewed in light of the 
facts surrounding the making of the statement to determine if the 
statement at issue was testimonial.  As an example, a witness to a 
stabbing may make a statement to a police officer that is considered 
testimonial, while the same statement made to another citizen 
witness may be considered non-testimonial because, inter alia, it is 
not a statement that a declarant would reasonably believe would be 
used later at trial. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals considered the facts 
surrounding the making of a 911 phone call when determining if 
the caller’s statement to the 911 operator was testimonial.75  The 
court held that the caller’s statement was not testimonial because 
she was not making “knowing responses to structured 
questioning.”76  This opinion seems to suggest that if 911 operators 
presented questions to a caller, the caller’s responses could be 
considered testimonial.77 
B. Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition and 
Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment78 
Declarations of the declarant’s present bodily condition 
and symptoms, including pain and other feelings, are 
admissible to prove the truth of the declarations as an 
exception to the hearsay rule.  Special reliability is 
considered to be furnished by the spontaneous quality of 
the declarations, assured by the requirement that the 
declarations purport to describe a condition presently 
existing at the time of the declaration.79 
As with excited utterances, a court must now address the 
surrounding circumstances when determining whether a 
declarant’s statement of his or her current physical condition is 
testimonial or non-testimonial.  The surrounding circumstances of 
 
 75. State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 301 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 76. Id. at 302. 
 77. See People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 406–07 (2004) (finding statements 
to a 911 operator were testimonial because the operator followed a prescribed 
pattern of questioning the caller); see also Snowden v. Maryland, 846 A.2d 36, 47 
(Md. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statements made by children to a licensed social 
worker to be testimonial because they were interviewed “for the expressed purpose 
of developing their testimony”). 
 78. MINN. R. EVID. 803(3), (4). 
 79. EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 291 (2d ed. 1972) 
(citations omitted). 
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the statement seem particularly relevant for this exception because, 
while a casual remark about a person’s physical condition may not 
be testimonial, if a victim of a sex crime or an assault goes to a 
doctor, the victim may be describing injuries with an eye toward 
catching and punishing the culprit.  In the latter situation, the 
victim’s statement could be made with prosecutorial use in mind.  
This flies in the face of the traditional reasoning for the hearsay 
exception for statements to medical personnel that, “reliability is 
assured by the likelihood that the patient believes that the 
effectiveness of the treatment he receives may depend largely upon 
the accuracy of the information he provides the physician.”80  
Similarly, some medical personnel may be trained in gathering 
evidence, in which case their questions to the victim may take on 
the tone of a police interrogation.81 
C. Former Testimony82 
The hearsay exception for former testimony requires that the 
declarant be unavailable and he or she formerly gave “testimony.”83  
Thus, former testimony does not present a Crawford issue. 
D. Statement Under Belief of Impending Death84 
The dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule provides 
for the admission of statements “made by a declarant while 
believing that the declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the 
cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be 
impending death.”85  In Crawford, the Court specifically addressed 
dying declarations and stated that they should be examined to 
determine if the statement given was testimonial or non-
testimonial.86 
 
 80. Id. at § 292. 
 81. See Minnesota v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 395–96 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2005).  An alleged child victim of sexual abuse was interviewed at a facility that 
specializes in “diagnosing whether a child has been a victim of abuse.”  Id. at 394.  
The court found that the victim’s statements were not testimonial because the 
interviewer “was not working on behalf of, or in conjunction with, investigating 
police officers or other government officials ‘for the purpose of developing the 
case against [the defendant].’”  Id. at 396. 
 82. MINN. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 804(b)(2). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1353, 1367 n.6 (2004) (stating that 
11
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After Crawford, when addressing a hearsay statement a court 
must not only ask whether a statement falls within one of the 
exceptions under the Rules of Evidence, it must also ask whether 
the statement passes the three hurdles of Crawford: (1) is the 
statement testimonial; (2) if the statement is testimonial, is the 
declarant unavailable; and (3) if the statement is testimonial and 
the declarant is unavailable, did the defendant have a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.87 
Nonetheless, if a statement is non-testimonial, then a court 
must look to Roberts.88  The Crawford decision did not clearly or 
completely overrule Roberts, which allows for the admission of 
hearsay if it falls under a recognized hearsay exception or if it bears 
indicia of reliability.89  In the Crawford decision, the Court’s 
disparaging language for Roberts may indicate that the Court is 
looking for an opportunity to clearly overrule it.90 
IV. CRAWFORD AND CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
Arguably, the hearsay admissibility rule of Roberts favored the 
introduction of prosecution hearsay at trial.  Under Roberts, a 
prosecutor could introduce “reliable” hearsay and that reliability 
could be satisfied by either showing that the statement fell within a 
traditional hearsay exception or by showing particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.91  “If a prosecutor was acute enough 
to identify several factors pointing to the reliability of the 
statement, he or she had a plausible contention that the 
Confrontation Clause allowed the introduction” of the statement.92  
After Crawford, this minimal showing is no longer enough.  “[T]he 
[Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of 
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.  
It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
 
“many dying declarations may not be testimonial”). 
 87. See  id. 
 88. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 89. Id. at 66. 
 90. Imwinkelried, supra note 74, at 18–19 (“The majority’s harsh criticism of 
Robert’s reliability standard makes it even more likely that the Court will eventually 
relax the standard for admitting nontestimonial hearsay. [The Court] describes 
[the] standard as ‘amorphous, if not entirely subjective’ easily susceptible to 
‘inconsistent application’ and ‘inherently . . . unpredictable.’”). 
 91. See generally Roberts, 448 U.S. 56. 
 92. Imwinkelried, supra note 74, at 17. 
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examination.”93  In effect, the Court’s decision removes from 
judges the decision as to whether a statement was made under 
conditions suggesting reliability.  Rather, if a statement is 
testimonial, the defendant must have had an opportunity to test its 
reliability before the statement can be admitted. 
With Crawford, the pendulum has swung in the opposite 
direction and criminal defense attorneys find themselves in the 
favored position when arguing to keep out prosecution hearsay.  
First, the key to admissibility is now whether a statement was 
“testimonial.”  Because a definition of “testimonial” was not 
provided, defense attorneys are unbounded in their debate of what 
testimonial is and is not.  Indeed, the concurrence recognized this 
weakness in the majority’s decision: 
[t]he Court grandly declares that “[w]e leave for another 
day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 
‘testimonial.’”  But the thousands of federal prosecutors 
and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors need 
answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of 
“testimony” the Court lists, is covered by the new rule.  
They need them now, not months or years from now.  
Rules of criminal evidence are applied every day in courts 
throughout the country, and parties should not be left in 
the dark in this manner.94 
Second, even traditionally recognized hearsay exceptions are 
now susceptible to challenge by defense attorneys.  For example, in 
a footnote, the Crawford opinion discusses the dying declaration 
hearsay exception and notes that, “[a]lthough many dying 
declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for 
admitting even those that clearly are.”95  The significance of this 
statement is that the Court refuses to make a blanket statement that 
all hearsay falls within the scope of the dying declaration 
exception.96 “[This] refusal suggests that the majority contemplates 
that in classifying hearsay as ‘testimonial’ or ‘non-testimonial,’ the 
trial judge should consider the specific circumstances surrounding 
the making of the statement.”97  Thus, even if a hearsay statement 
falls within a traditional exception, if the declarant is unavailable, 
there is still an argument to be made concerning whether the 
 
 93. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1353, 1370 (2004). 
 94. Id. at 1378 (citations omitted). 
 95. Id. at 1367 n.6. 
 96. Imwinkeried, supra note 74, at 17–18. 
 97. Id. at 18. 
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statement was “testimonial” before it can be introduced into 
evidence. 
Third, the Court’s broad language may suggest that hearsay 
exceptions not recognized under the historical understanding of 
the hearsay rule should not be recognized by current courts.98  For 
example, the Court stated, 
[a]mdt. 6, is most naturally read as a reference to the 
right of confrontation at common law, admitting only 
those exceptions established at the time of the founding.  
As the English authorities . . . reveal, the common law in 
1791 conditioned admissibility of an absent witness’s 
examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine.  The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates 
those limitations.99 
Even though the rule of Crawford seems to favor the defense in 
criminal trials, prosecutors are not left without options.  For 
example, Crawford leaves the rule of forfeiture intact,100 which 
allows admission of evidence when a defendant has procured a 
witness’s absence.101  With Crawford, the rule of forfeiture may 
become more frequently used in assault cases and cases of domestic 
violence.  If a prosecutor can show that a witness is absent due to 
the defendant’s actions, then he or she may be able to admit the 
absent witness’s hearsay.102  “In short, prosecutors should be on the 
lookout for evidence that supports the argument that a defendant 
has forfeited his right to confrontation by his own wrongdoing.”103 
Another key for prosecutors is that when a victim testifies on behalf 
of a defendant, Crawford does not apply because when a victim 
 
 98. Id. (“[T]he defense can argue that the Crawford majority relies so heavily 
on the original historical understanding of the hearsay rule that the Confrontation 
Clause precludes the recognition of radically new hearsay exceptions.”). 
 99. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365–66 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  See 
Imwinkelried, supra note 74, at 18. 
 100. Adam M. Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid: Applying 
Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, 38 PROSECUTOR 14, 15 (Dec. 
2004). 
 101. MINN. R. EVID. 804(a) (stating that a declarant is not “unavailable” if the 
declarant’s absence is due to the “procurement of wrongdoing of the proponent 
of the statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or 
testifying”). 
 102. See State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Minn. 2004) (admitting the 
grand jury testimony of an unavailable declarant because the defendant procured 
the declarant’s absence). 
 103. Krischer, supra note 100, at 15. 
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testifies, the victim is not “unavailable.”104  Finally, because the 
Crawford Court declined to define testimonial, like defense 
attorneys, prosecutors are free to argue the definition of 
“testimonial.” 
V. CONCLUSION 
Crawford v. Washington restricted the admissibility of 
testimonial hearsay evidence.  Not only does the decision partially 
overrule Ohio v. Roberts, the Court’s disparaging language of the 
Roberts reliability test may suggest that Roberts will be completely 
overruled soon. 
Although Crawford appears to favor the defense in criminal 
trials, the rule more accurately reflects what the Court believes the 
Framers intended for the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth 
Amendment.  Because the decision does not clearly define 
“testimonial,” it is likely that this is where new courtroom 
arguments concerning Crawford are likely to be. 
 
 
 104. Id. at 16. 
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